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Abstract: Elinor Ostrom’s IAD (Institutional Analysis and Development) and 
SES (Social-Ecological Systems) frameworks are widely used by social scien-
tists and policy analysts, but many applications fail to take full advantage of the 
potential utility of either framework. The IAD framework lacks detail regarding 
the specific variables that influence social interactions and neglects questions of 
asymmetric power and collective evaluation. The SES framework, meanwhile, 
supports detailed variable-oriented analyses of social-ecological systems, but 
rarely addresses the dynamic processes that lie at the heart of the IAD framework. 
We outline a Combined IAD-SES (CIS) Framework that remedies these problems 
by combining them in a format suited both to social-ecological systems and other 
policy settings. Institutional analysts using this combined framework should start 
their analysis by identifying a set of focal action situations, learning how the rel-
evant collective and constitutional choice arenas shaped their structures, and then 
thinking deeply about the processes through which those conditions have been (or 
might be) changed. We demonstrate the potential utility of CIS by applying it to 
previous research on Maine’s lobster fishery.
Keywords: IAD Framework, institutional analysis, lobster fishery, SES 
framework
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1. Introduction
Elinor Ostrom played a pivotal role in developing two analytical frameworks 
used by many policy analysts and scholars: the IAD (Institutional Analysis and 
Development) and the SES (Social-Ecological Systems) frameworks. Both frame-
works have facilitated collaborative research and communication among scholars 
and practitioners from a wide range of disciplinary and professional backgrounds. 
However, certain aspects of each can result in confusion among readers unfa-
miliar with the Bloomington School of Political Economy (Aligica and Boettke 
2009), or result in applications that only partially realize the full potential of either 
framework. In this paper we aim to clear up these confusions and encourage users 
to pursue more sophisticated analyses based on an integrated framework, namely, 
the Combined IAD-SES Framework, or CIS for short.
We begin with brief summaries of the foundational components of the IAD 
and SES frameworks, and use elements of each framework to serve as a counter-
weight to problematic tendencies commonly found in applications of the other. At 
their core, the IAD and SES are very closely related frameworks, and our discus-
sion highlights their fundamental similarities while attempting to overcome their 
separate limitations. But our aspirations are limited: we do not pretend to offer a 
fully developed causal theory or formal model.1 We are nonetheless confident that 
the particular combination we propose here can serve as a solid foundation for 
advances in the study of how institutions and policy outcomes evolve in tandem.
In an effort to forestall misunderstandings, we apply this combined frame-
work to a case familiar to many scholars interested in the origins and operation of 
self-organized systems of resource governance, namely, lobster fisheries off the 
coast of Maine. We conclude with a brief discussion of related lines of research by 
scholars drawing upon other frameworks, in order to locate this CIS framework 
within its proper context.
2. The IAD framework
The IAD framework that Elinor Ostrom developed alongside colleagues from the 
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis has been widely adopted by 
social scientists to evaluate the effects of alternative institutional arrangements, 
and to investigate the processes by which institutions emerge and change over time 
1
 In Ostrom’s vocabulary, the terms “frameworks,” “theories,” and “models” are terms of art. Ostrom 
and Cox (2010, 5) suggest that “frameworks” may best be thought of as “metatheoretical conceptual 
map[s].” Ostrom (2011, 8–9) describes “frameworks” as the “most generalized form of theoretical 
analysis,” providing a general set of variables that comprise a meta-language, which is used for com-
parative institutional analyses of various “theories” and “models. “Theories” (e.g. economic theory 
or game theory) posit assumptions and hypothesized specifications of relevant variables (provided 
by the framework) deemed sufficient to provide adequate explanations or diagnoses of the policy set-
ting under study. “Models” (e.g. the rational actor model or game-theory models) use more “precise 
assumptions about a limited set of variables and parameters to derive precise predictions about the 
results of combining these variables using a particular theory.”
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(see, e.g. Tang 1992; Rudd 2004; Andersson 2006; Ostrom 2007a; Ostrom and 
Cox 2010). It is widely recognized as one of the leading frameworks in the policy 
sciences (Weible and Sabatier 2018) and provided the analytical foundation upon 
which Elinor Ostrom built a collaborative research program on community-based 
management of natural resources, for which she was named a co-recipient of the 
2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. Ostrom (1986, 1989, 2005, 
2007a, 2010, 2011; see also Kiser and Ostrom 1982) envisioned this framework 
as a means whereby scholars from multiple disciplines could more effectively 
communicate with one another, regardless of their diverse perspectives, to better 
understand complex policy settings.
As shown in Figure 1, the IAD framework represents institutional processes 
by a series of boxes within which different variables or processes are located. At 
the heart of the IAD framework is an action situation, an abstraction of decision 
environments in which individuals and corporate actors interact with one another, 
making choices that jointly determine outcomes of some aspects of a policy ques-
tion. Individual choices and collective outcomes are influenced by the beliefs and 
incentives of the relevant individuals, as shaped by the responsibilities and social 
expectations attached to official positions they may hold, and by the information 
available to them.
The specific nature of the decision problem faced by actors within a partic-
ular action situation is shaped by preexisting contextual conditions,2
 grouped 
for analytical purposes into three categories: (1) the “nature of the good” under 
consideration, including all relevant biophysical conditions; (2) “attributes of the 
community,” social ties and the cultural context within which individuals inter-
act and (3) “rules-in-use,” the existing configuration of laws, regulations, rules, 
norms, and shared understandings held by the participants to be relevant to their 
deliberations. Outcomes from an action situation are evaluated by the relevant 
actors (some of whom may not have been involved in the original decision). 
Feedback from these outcomes and evaluations can reinforce or induce changes 
in these contextual conditions, which in turn sets the stage for future interactions.
The IAD framework differentiates among three different types (or levels) 
of action situations: (1) operational-choice settings in which actors’ choices 
directly impact tangible outcomes, (2) policymaking or collective-choice set-
tings in which actors shape the rules that constrain actors in operational-choice 
arenas, and (3) settings for constitutional-choice in which decisions are made 
concerning which actors have a stand in different choice situations as well as 
which kinds of alternative institutional mechanisms are available to them as they 
2
 Although in earlier versions of the IAD figure the boxes for these contextual conditions are labeled 
as “exogenous factors,” those factors are instead endogenous to cycles of collective action occurring 
(or not occurring) in many interlinked action situations. Consequently, we use the terms “contextual 
factors” or “pre-existing conditions” to denote the values taken on by relevant variables immediately 
preceding the occurrence of a focal action situation (or a network of inter-connected action situa-
tions).
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make their collective deliberations and operational-level choices (Ostrom 2005, 
58–62). In all types of action situations, biophysical, legal-institutional, and 
socio-cultural factors interact in complex ways to shape patterns of interactions 
and outcomes.
Each action situation describes a nexus in which a group of decision mak-
ers jointly confront important decisions related to some policy concerns. Potential 
outcomes are differentially valued by actors with partial control over the final 
determination of results. Ostrom (1986, 2005) explicitly frames an action situation 
as a generalization of standard game models. To define a game, modelers must 
specify the actors involved, the information available to them, their options and the 
 outcomes their choices can jointly generate. Similarly, an action situation is con-
figured by interlocking “working components,” related in the following manner:
Participants, who can either be individuals or any of a wide diversity of organ-
ized entities, are assigned to positions. In these positions, they choose among 
actions in light of their information, the control they have over  action-outcome 
linkages, and the benefits and costs assigned to actions and outcomes. (Ostrom 
2005, 188; italics added)
The specific nature of each of these italicized components will have been deter-
mined by processes occurring previously or simultaneously in other strategic 
interactions, that is, in other action situations occurring at any of the three levels 
of choice.
The strength of the IAD framework stems from “its systematic theoreti-
cal focus on the impact of rules and norms on individual incentives in com-
plex systems, its emphasis on empirical analysis of outcomes and consideration 
Biophysical
conditions
Attributes of
community
Rules-in-use
Action
situation* Interactions
Outcomes
Evaluative
criteria
Contextual factors
Feedback
Figure 1: Basic components of the IAD framework.
Source: Adapted from Ostrom (2010, 646).
*Note: Earlier versions divided an action situation into actors and an action arena.
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of  multiple dynamic systemic processes that jointly affect those outcomes” 
(Rudd 2004). In short, the IAD framework recognizes the complexity of the 
world, but provides researchers with a tool to cope with this complexity and 
integrate knowledge across multiple studies and methods. The framework is 
sufficiently general to explore collective action problems of all kinds, but its 
greatest influence has been in the area of environmental policy where it was 
used to uncover the institutional foundations of sustainable community-based 
natural resource management (Ostrom 1990; Gibson et al. 2000; Cox et al. 
2010). Nonetheless the framework has also been used, albeit to a lesser extent, to 
explore the processes by which institutions for common-pool resource manage-
ment emerge (Ostrom 1990, Chapter 4; Lubell et al. 2002; Grossman 2019), and 
understand the factors influencing the delivery of public services in metropolitan 
areas (Bushouse 2011; Oakerson and Parks 2011).
Although most published applications of the IAD framework include a ver-
sion of Figure 1, that figure inappropriately conveys the image of an atomistic 
action situation, which is not how Ostrom intended this framework to be under-
stood. Her writings clearly stress that no action situation exists in total isolation 
from others (see Kiser and Ostrom 1982; Ostrom 1986, 1989, 2005). Figure 2 
shows how a single action situation can be connected to a series of “adjacent” 
action situations, each of which has the effect of setting the values for one or more 
of the working components that define that focal action situation. In general, no 
single action situation can be fully understood without careful consideration of 
the web within which it resides.
A close examination of the “canonical” IAD representation of Figure 1 reveals 
an implicit clue that points towards the necessary involvement of at least one 
more action situation beyond the one being represented. Evaluative criteria do not 
come out of nowhere, but must have been determined by actors establishing the 
relevance of alternative evaluative criteria to particular situations. Presumably, 
individual actors in the focal action situation will engage in various forms of 
evaluation as they consider their next choices. In addition, for any single (type 
of) action situation, there must exist at least one corresponding collective choice 
arena in which actors have, either individually or as a group, selected a list of 
criteria they deem appropriate for evaluation of its outcomes.
Figure 2 does not indicate that each action situation is associated with 
its own unique categories of contextual conditions. Instead, it is more useful 
to presume that many of the same biophysical conditions, community attri-
butes, and rules-in-use may apply to multiple nodes in any network of adja-
cent action situations. Implicitly, then, all factors within a given category that 
are deemed to be relevant to at least one action situation in that network could, 
for analytical purposes, be collected together into a comprehensive list of rel-
evant variables within that category. Then, the specific contextual conditions 
applying to any particular action situation would be a subset of factors drawn 
from these comprehensive lists. This same idea was incorporated into the SES 
framework.
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3. The SES framework
The IAD framework was promoted as an interdisciplinary research tool with 
which social and natural scientists could build knowledge concerning the sus-
tainability of social-ecological systems. However, after many years of criticism 
and complaints that the IAD framework paid insufficient attention to the diver-
sity and complexity of natural systems and processes (Berkes and Folke 1998; 
Young 2002; Agrawal 2003; Ostrom and Cox 2010, 6) and to alternative social 
science theories (such as Young 2002), Ostrom and her colleagues began develop-
ing a framework specifically designed for the analysis of closely-coupled social-
ecological frameworks (Anderies et al. 2004; Ostrom 2007b, 2009; Ostrom et al. 
2007; Ostrom and Cox 2010; McGinnis and Ostrom 2014).
Figure 3 shows the basic components of the SES framework, as modified 
by Epstein et al. (2013). It includes seven categories of attributes of any social-
ecological system: Resource Systems (RS), Resource Units (RU), Governance 
Systems (GS), Actors (A), Related Social, Economic and Political Systems (S), 
Ecological Rules (ER), and Related Ecosystems (ECO). Those first-tier com-
ponents are further decomposable into second-, third-, and in some cases even 
fourth-tier variables (as in Table 1). This nested structure supports finely-grained 
analyses of social and ecological conditions, which is the chief strength of the 
SES framework.
Policies that 
define feasible 
options and 
shape incentives Socialization processes
Payoff
rules
Choice
rules
Position
rules
Boundary
rules Actors
Assigned to
Assigned to
Actions
Net costs
and benefits
assigned to
Potential
outcomes
Control
over
Aggregation
rules
Information
rules
Information
about
Scope
rules
Linked toPositions
Policy evaluationConstruction ofcollective entities
and/or definition
of jurisdictions
Actions of other groups
which directly affect
outcomes
Markets and other
valuation processes
Figure 2: Action situations adjacent to a focal action situation.
Source: McGinnis (2011, 54); Interior figure based on Ostrom (2005, 189).
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The SES framework has not been applied to as wide a range of policy settings 
as IAD (Schlager and Cox 2018), but nonetheless has been used to investigate 
the governance of forests, fisheries, irrigation and rangelands (i.e. Ostrom and 
Cox 2010; Fleischman et al. 2010; Gutierrez et al. 2011; Addison and Greiner 
2016). Although it was intended to facilitate consistent data coding for purposes 
of assessments across numbers of cases (see, e.g. Ostrom and Cox 2010, 9; 
Fleischman et al. 2014; Ban et al. 2017), considerable difficulties remain to coor-
dinate the collection and coding of data by different research teams (Thiel et al. 
2015; Frey 2017; Gari et al. 2018; Partelow 2018).
The core element of the IAD framework–action situations–lies at the very 
heart of later versions of the SES figures to which Ostrom contributed directly 
(Ostrom and Cox 2010; McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). This potentially gives the 
SES a deeply dynamic orientation. Unfortunately, most applications of the SES 
framework generate long lists of factors that may have contributed to one or more 
outcomes (Basurto and Ostrom 2009; Fleischman 2010; Blanco 2011; Gutierrez 
et al. 2011; Ban et al. 2017). Although this approach could be used to identify 
combinations of SES attributes associated with the full range of relevant out-
comes, these lists of variables can provide no basis for understanding the pro-
cess by which these social, institutional and ecological factors combined to shape 
collective-choice and operational processes to generate those outcomes, let alone 
predicting or prescribing changes to social-ecological conditions over time. As a 
result, scholars are left to choose between a finely-detailed but ultimately static 
analysis with the SES framework or a more dynamic but underspecified analysis 
with the IAD framework.
Related social, economic, and political systems (S)
Governance
systems (GS)
Resource
systems (RS)
Ec
ol
og
ica
l r
ul
es
 (E
R)
Action situations
interactions (I) → outcomes (O)
Resource units
(RU) Actors (A)
Related ecosystems (ECO)
Direct causal link
Feedback
Figure 3: The SES framework.
Source: Adapted from Ostrom and Cox (2010) and Epstein et al. (2013).
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SES improves upon IAD by expanding the number of categories of relevant 
and decomposable, contextual variables. A close comparison of Ostrom’s two 
frameworks reveals that many, and perhaps all, of the SES variables are con-
tained, if only implicitly, within the IAD framework. Two IAD categories are 
directly analogous to first-tier SES categories: “attributes of the community” 
include the attributes of actors (and their connections) and the term “rules-in-
use” has often been used to encompass all aspects of a governance system. 
Furthermore, the IAD category of biophysical conditions (a generalization of 
the initial “nature of the good” label) could be divided into two parts, one refer-
ring to specific resource units and the other to the resource system as a whole. 
In this way, each of the first-tier categories of the SES framework closely match 
the “Biophysical Conditions,” “Community Attributes,” and “Rules-in-Use” 
boxes of the IAD framework. Finally, the remaining categories for other social 
or ecological processes in the SES framework can be seen as holders for the 
potential effects of action situations remote from focal action situations that lie 
at the heart of any empirical analysis.
Yet, with a few exceptions (Cox 2014b; Vogt et al. 2015; McCord et al. 2017) 
most applications of the SES framework fail to attend to the critical importance of 
identifying and analyzing sets of focal action situations. As shown in Table 1, the 
variables listed under the Action Situation column on the right are not comparable 
to those listed in the columns corresponding to high-level categories of contextual 
or explanatory variables. Instead, a range of functionally different types of action 
situations are listed, without any attention to how these action situations are likely 
to differ from one another, or to the density of connections amongst them. The 
core attributes of an action situation are the working components, as shown in 
Figure 2, but that aspect of the IAD toolbox is generally missing from SES-based 
applications.
The literature on institutional analysis of social-ecological systems is cur-
rently dominated by two strands of research: (1) variable-oriented research 
which identifies configurations of social-ecological attributes associated with 
outcomes; and (2) process-oriented descriptive case studies that describe how 
institutions emerge and change, influencing behaviour and outcomes with very 
little interplay between the two approaches. This paper can, and in at least one 
case already has (McCord et al. 2017), help to address this gap by encouraging 
variable-oriented researchers to be more attentive to processes, and vice versa. 
But our help can only take us so far, because the purpose of a framework is 
not to explain outcomes, but to provide a tool for identifying, categorizing and 
organizing variables and processes for analysis. The CIS framework can help 
scholars to organize and integrate insights from variable-oriented research (i.e. 
most applications of the SES framework) and process-oriented research involv-
ing networks of action situations, but it does not in and of itself provide tools 
for inference. 
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4. An overview of the combined IAD-SES framework
We argue that anyone using the SES framework should carefully examine all 
action situations directly germane to the operation of that system and the values 
of the working components (see the interior part of Figure 2) that comprise it. 
They should also dig more deeply into the system to identify how these situa-
tions are interlinked, with particular attention to locating adjacent action situ-
ations that are responsible for the functional components within a focal action 
situation. The combined framework we outline here is primarily intended to 
help SES researchers make more effective use of the analytical strengths of the 
IAD framework by shifting the focus towards the analysis of action situations 
rather than variables.
Although Ostrom did not use the term “action situation” in her initial ver-
sions of SES (Ostrom 2007, 2009), she responded positively to suggestions by 
colleagues in the informal “SES Club” to explicitly add that term (see McGinnis 
and Ostrom 2014). Her original figures had placed interactions and outcomes at 
the center of the SES framework, but when she added the action situation term, 
she collapsed action situations, patterns of interactions, and outcomes (each of 
which had its own separate box in the IAD) into a single entity. By applying the 
same aggregation to the IAD framework of Figure 1, we end up with a much 
simpler version of the IAD which helped inspire the combined framework we 
offer here.
The canonical form of the IAD framework has multiple paths through which 
feedbacks can occur, with many of those feedback paths connecting outcomes 
and interactions to action situations and outcomes to potential changes in the pre-
existing contextual conditions. All but the last of these feedback paths would lie 
within a single box, if we were to follow the SES expedient of aggregating action, 
interactions, and outcomes together in a single amalgam. This one link between 
outcomes and contextual conditions is worth careful consideration because this is 
the path through which the contextual conditions are endogenously determined 
within the broader network of adjacent action situations.
The simplicity of this one tie-back to contextual conditions enables us to rear-
range the overall figure in a way that more directly represents the natural temporal 
order of before, during, and after the operation of action situations within the 
SES-style amalgam. That is, we can locate a network of action situations between 
an array of boxes on the left, representing the context from which those action 
situations emerged, and a similar list of the same boxes on the right, to denote how 
those variables had been changed by feedback from the actions, interactions, and 
outcomes occurring in that network. Figure 4 shows this simple arrangement of a 
set of contextual factors setting the stage for a network of interconnected strategic 
action, interactions, and outcomes, with the outcomes of those interactions feed-
ing forward to reset conditions for the next iteration of the relevant action situa-
tions. This seems a much more natural representation of the temporal sequence of 
before, during, and after.
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As we argued above, the evaluative action situations in which the evalua-
tive criteria were determined should also be included, where possible, within 
a  network of focal action situations. There are two potential pathways through 
which this feedback or, more appropriately, “feed forward” into the next itera-
tion, can occur. Feedback that has been shaped by the application of existing 
evaluative criteria can be interpreted as following a more indirect path than would 
feedback that directly changes the values of contextual factors. Such direct effects 
need not involve conscious intervention on the part of the humans involved in 
this system and could instead operate independently of human agency. We argue 
that in many cases it is useful to explicitly separate direct (unmediated) and indi-
rect (through some evaluative process) pathways of change in conditions shaping 
future interactions.
As the SES framework already expresses feedback paths from an integrated 
action-interaction-outcome amalgam to each of the four categories of potentially 
relevant contextual variables, it too could be easily rearranged to fit the obvious 
temporal sequence of before, during, and after the operation of the dynamic pro-
cesses occurring within that amalgam. The distinction between direct and indirect 
(human-mediated) paths of feedback are especially relevant for the types of pol-
icy settings to which the SES framework was designed to be most applicable. As 
emphasized by Epstein et al. (2013), the SES framework as originally conceptual-
ized did not allow for the operation of ecological processes that remain untouched 
by human agency, even though that possibility can hardly be denied when consid-
ering micro-level biological, physical or chemical processes that occur over time 
spans too short for human intervention, as well as macro-level processes of global 
change that may be extraordinarily difficult for any analyst to fully observe with 
a single human lifespan.
Figure 4 may be a deceptively simple representation of our proposed CIS 
framework, and it’s worth reviewing how we constructed it by rearranging com-
ponent parts each of these frameworks into a coherent whole that highlights their 
complementary strengths.
Pre-existing conditions
Resource 
systems
Resource units
Governance
systems
Actors
Outcomes and effects
Resource 
systems
Resource units
Governance
systems
Actors
Network of focal
action situations
Figure 4: Generic representation of combined IAD-SES framework.
Source: Authors.
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From the IAD we take the realization that contextual factors set the stage 
for any nexus of strategic interaction among actors seeking to effect or forestall 
changes in some policy setting, and that the patterns of interactions and outcomes 
that emerge from those action situations can in turn re-shape the values of these 
same contextual variables, and thereby open up new opportunities, or impose 
additional restrictions, on subsequent choices and events.
We depart from the traditional understanding of the IAD framework in three 
important ways. First, we insist that no action situation stands in complete 
isolation, and that our scope of analysis must encompass a broader network 
of adjacent action situations whose outcomes mutually shape the contextual 
conditions under which other nodes in this network operate. Second, we insist 
that evaluation can be seen as a distinct mode of collective action, worthy of 
being treated as an action situation in its own right. Third, by incorporating 
sites of evaluative interactions into this network representation, we distinguish 
between direct effects and indirect pathways mediated by individual or collec-
tive evaluations and reactions, both of which contribute to the ways in which 
the outcomes of action situations shape their own future operation as well as 
the concurrent (and subsequent) operations of other action situations to which 
it is connected.
From the SES framework we adopt its assertion that processes operating at 
the level of resource units and resource systems are equally important, increas-
ing the number of categories of relevant contextual conditions to four (from the 
three in IAD). However, in doing so we redirect our analytic attention away 
from these variables themselves to focus instead on the dynamic processes 
through which those conditions are determined, and through which they might 
be changed by conscious design. Although the multiplicity of relevant action 
situations is alluded to in later versions of the SES, we prefer an explicitly net-
worked interpretation.
We also simplify some aspects of the SES framework which have not proven to 
be critical in many applications. For example, Figure 3 indicates that the four cat-
egories of contextual factors should also be expected to occur in multiple variants, 
to depict the simultaneous influences of distinct resource systems or governance 
systems, or diverse resource units and actors within those systems (McGinnis and 
Ostrom 2014). We prefer to represent this multiplicity instead in the networks 
of action situations located at the center of Figure 4. We realize that multiple 
resources and resource systems are present in all policy settings, but they are typi-
cally interconnected in some systematic manner, and those interconnections can 
be more effectively studied by focusing on the network of interconnected action 
situations through which those conditions are shaped. We suggest that analysts 
collect all the relevant contextual factors from different manifestations of sys-
tems, units, or actors into comprehensive lists, from which analysts focusing on 
any action situation can draw out a subset of those factors most directly relevant 
to its operation, instead of requiring that each action situation has its own associ-
ated list.
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In addition, Figure 4 does not include any reference to the “related” ecosys-
tems or social-economic-political systems that bracket the core SES box in Figure 
3. Nor do we include a separate category for “ecological rules,” as suggested 
by Epstein et al. (2013). We do, however, acknowledge that there remain some 
ecological or physical process that lie outside the scope of direct human interven-
tion, either because of the current limits on our scientific knowledge or a lack of 
instruments through which we might effect change directly into those processes. 
But these might be better understood as dynamic processes that have not yet been 
incorporated within a network of action situations in which human agency can be 
realized.
Thus, further scientific research might move some of these hidden processes 
within the realm of human intervention. Demographers, economists, and other 
social scientists have identified the operation of dynamic processes that operate 
on human society in ways that are not directly observable by individuals, as well 
as deep and hidden structures of power that shape human society in ways that 
are not easily discerned by the humans operating within those structures (Lukes 
2005). When such hidden processes or structures become more fully understood, 
then they may prove amenable to change via collective action. Or, in other cases, 
particularly powerful actors may have the capacity to prevent significant change. 
Our combined framework should provide a way of dealing with that contingency 
as well.
Clement (2010), for instance, expands the IAD framework in a natural man-
ner by adding two additional categories of contextual variables to highlight the 
potential consequences of social-economic foundations for political power and 
the ways in which public discourse can be shaped to favor the interests of influ-
ential actors. Kashwan (2016), meanwhile, illustrates how power asymmetries 
and differential access to institutional arenas in a network of adjacent action 
situations can fundamentally shape policy outcomes in the particular context 
of forestry governance in India. Both of these analyses highlight an important 
point made most clearly by Knight (1992), that when actors work together 
to construct any new institutional arrangement, or to revise an existing one, 
the result is fundamentally shaped by any asymmetries in power among those 
actors. He argues that all institutions have distributional consequences, and that 
actors’ expectations of these consequences will shape the details of that insti-
tutional arrangement. Knight’s particular model specifies that these details will 
work in the favor of those actors who have the stronger “outside option,” that 
is, those who are less directly dependent on the continuation of this relation-
ship. We are proposing a mode of analysis that encourages analysts to identify 
the action situations in which those outside options are themselves determined. 
Any outside actors seeking to nudge the direct participants into establishing a 
more equitable relationship may find it more effective to intervene in those adja-
cent action situations, rather than insert themselves directly into the negotiation 
process.
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Analysts working within the Bloomington School tradition tend to focus on 
the problem-solving aspect of policy problems and downplay the extent to which 
powerful actors can prevent outcomes that would significantly reduce their own 
power. In our proposed framework, power asymmetries can limit the ability of 
potential reformers to effectively participate in certain institutional arenas.3 After 
all, actors who control access to sites of constitutional deliberation need not be 
willing to listen to new voices, nor to adopt new modes of decision making.
In summary, this CIS framework borrows aspects of both the IAD and SES 
frameworks, while changing each in significant ways. In the next section we illus-
trate how this CIS framework can be applied to a specific empirical setting, as 
an example for researchers interested in adopting a similar mode of analysis in 
their own work. As we emphasize above, the purpose of a framework is not to 
explain outcomes, but to provide a tool for identifying, categorizing, and organ-
izing variables and processes for analysis. The CIS framework can help scholars 
to organize and integrate insights from variable-oriented research (i.e. most appli-
cations of the SES framework) and process-oriented research involving networks 
of action situations, but it does not in and of itself provide tools for inference. In 
the next section we demonstrate how the CIS framework can be used to organize 
a body of analysis, and in that illustration we rely upon inferences drawn in well-
respected peer-reviewed studies of Maine’s lobster fishery.
5. An illustration of the CIS framework in action
Maine’s lobster fishery has been richly described and analyzed in a series of highly 
regarded publications, including Acheson (1988, 1997, 2003, 2013), Acheson and 
Wilson (1996), and Wilson et al. (2013). To help focus the example, we draw 
particularly upon a specific article in which Acheson (1997) introduces a distinc-
tion between different phases of the evolution of the governance of Maine lobster 
fisheries from around 1940 to the time of that publication.
We recommend that scholars using the CIS framework begin with an inventory 
of the relevant contextual and explanatory variables emphasized in the relevant 
research literatures. Many of these variables should be located within one of the 
four primary categories of the SES (and CIS) framework, but researchers should 
feel free to draw explicitly upon additional conceptual categories as needed. We 
emphasize that any inventory of relevant variables is only the first stage of analy-
sis. They must then look for significant changes in the values of key outcomes or 
contextual variables and posit a set of potential breakpoints that can be used to 
divide the time span under investigation into shorter periods during which a con-
nected set of processes can be identified for further investigation. These variables 
3
 Although we do not have the space to explore this point fully here, our CIS framework might sup-
port a useful connection to Stephen Lukes’ classic distinction among three faces of power: winning in 
a direct competition, exerting control over the policy-making agenda, and exerting a deeper influence 
over modes of rhetoric and language (see Lukes 2005; Clement 2010; Epstein et al. 2014).
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should be understood as pointers to specific action situations within the relevant 
network of focal or adjacent action situations, that is, to those sites of interaction 
where those changes are most likely to have occurred (and thus where future 
policy interventions might prove especially efficacious). 
Then comes the critical question of deciding which of these adjacent action 
situations are the most promising for subsequent analysis. These decisions should 
be guided by lessons gleaned from the relevant research literatures, as well as the 
analysts’ own previous experience. All of these should be concentrated on the 
primary goal, namely, to identify the forces driving changes in the core network 
of inter-connected action situations during each period.
By comparing the values of key variables at different points in time, we can 
bracket times of significant changes in those and other variables throughout that 
time period. The values of contextual variables in effect at the beginning of each 
period denote a partial equilibrium that must somehow have been disrupted in a 
way that generated changes at the end of that period.4 Times when new laws are 
passed or new organizations established should prove especially useful candidates 
for potential breakpoints, but exogenous shocks, such as the introduction of a new 
technology or climate event, may also be particularly relevant in some circum-
stances. There can be no hard and fast rules about the selection of breakpoints 
and focal action situations, and any research should fully expect to experience 
multiple iterations of this search process.
For this exercise Acheson has already done most of the work for us, in his 
extensive evaluations of the major changes that occurred during this entire period 
(see especially Acheson 2003 and Acheson and Steneck 1997). We use this pro-
cedure to demonstrate how the critical locus of action changes from period to 
period, after new action situations have been established or existing ones start to 
move in new directions.
Although Acheson considers several factors in marking breakpoints between 
different periods, we find it useful for our purpose of demonstrating the virtues of 
the CIS framework to focus our attention on specific years when the nature of the 
relevant governance processes changed in a significant manner. Our first break 
point is 1872, when the state of Maine enacted its first laws limiting the kinds 
of lobsters that could legally be harvested and sold. The next major breakpoint 
comes in 1933, when the first double gauge law set both the minimum and maxi-
mum sizes of lobsters. In 1977 the national government became directly involved 
in regulating Maine lobster fisheries, with Congressional passage of the FCMA 
(Fisheries Conservation and Management Act). Our final break point comes in 
1995 with the formal establishment of a zone-based co-management regime 
4
 Equilibrium is too strong a term, because the processes occurring in all relevant action situations 
will continue to operate before and after each breakpoint. These breakpoints are snapshots of an 
ongoing dynamic process, which can help us identify which changes are most in need to further 
investigation, and these changes direct us to the processes through which those changes were enacted 
(that is, to the appropriate set of focal action situations).
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involving local fishers as well as national, state, and local officials. Although the 
conditions of the Maine lobster industry continued to change after this time, the 
following overview of the periods between these breakpoints should be sufficient 
to illustrate how the CIS framework can be used to structure an analysis concern-
ing dynamic institutional processes. 
By selecting our breakpoints on the basis of significant changes in gover-
nance, we are positing that these were indeed consequential events that sub-
stantially changed the later evolution of that fishery and the governance system 
associated with it. If we were to attempt a more complete investigation of this 
empirical case, we would need to also consider other potential types of break-
points, and look into the processes through which those changes were produced 
as well.
In Table 2 we offer an overview of our understanding of the analysis in 
Acheson (1997), based on our choice of specific breakpoints. The top row lists 
basic conditions of lobsters as a resource unit and the resource system in which 
they live, as well as the nature of the primary actors and the rules that govern 
this resource. Every second row revises these conditions or introduces new ones 
in order to reflect the changed conditions observed for subsequent breakpoints. 
Rows placed between these breakpoint rows summarize the most important pat-
terns of interactions and outcomes observed in the focal action situations of par-
ticular importance for that period of time.
We use bold font to denote significant changes in the values of key contex-
tual variables in effect at each of the breakpoints. Analysts should pay particular 
attention to the changing cast of focal action situations at different times. It is here 
that the most detailed analysis should be focused. We designate (in bold) those 
action situations which were newly established by the outcome of the breakpoint 
opening that period, or previously important action situations that now operate 
in a way much different than in the preceding period. After setting the stage by 
reviewing the pre-1872 condition of Maine lobster fisheries, we will highlight 
significant changes in each period in the remainder of this section (and in Figures 
5 through 7).
5.1. Key SES variables for the pre-1872 Period
The American lobster (Homarus americanus) is a highly valued benthic inverte-
brate found along the Atlantic coast of North America between Southern Labrador 
and North Carolina. Lobsters are nomadic, tending to occupy partially overlap-
ping series of home ranges, remaining within each for periods of 1–2 weeks before 
moving on to adjacent areas (Scopel et al. 2009). A lobster’s range increases with 
age and size, although most lobsters occupy deeper waters at low densities dur-
ing the winter months before concentrating in shallower waters in the spring and 
summer. All of these movements, however, tend to be fairly limited; most lobsters 
are recaptured within a two-mile radius of where they are tagged and released 
(Wilson et al. 2013).
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Lobsters reproduce annually after the summer molt. Females carry their egg 
broods, which can include tens of thousands of eggs, for up to a year. Fecundity 
tends to increase with age, so that older, larger lobsters are more prolific breed-
ers (holding constant other factors such as temperature).5 Lobsters are vulnerable 
to predation by other marine species, including ground fish (RU3), especially in 
early stages of their life cycle.
Natural system boundaries (RS1) tend to be fairly distinct for lobsters as a 
result of their life history characteristics that confine activities to a fairly small 
geographical area. This facilitates the use of territoriality in the governance sys-
tem, where groups (described by Acheson (1988) as “lobster gangs”) can act 
collectively to exclude outsiders from their respective territories, and invest in 
the development of formal and informal monitoring and sanctioning systems. 
Although individual lobsters can and do migrate across “lobster gang” boundar-
ies, groups that invest in conservation within their respective boundaries gener-
ally can expect to benefit from those efforts.
The lobster fishers of Maine have long operated within a social environment 
that promotes cooperation, even as they compete for shares of each year’s catch. 
The life of a lobster fisher is oriented around the harbor where they and other lobster 
fishers ply their trade, and the larger community in which they reside. Many are sec-
ond- or third-generation lobster fishers, who have been raised with the values and 
norms that have developed over generations in the fishery (Acheson 1988). They 
also possess a wealth of local knowledge. Barriers to entry in the form of licensing 
and informal pressure from harbor gangs helps to ensure the continuity of social 
norms and values. As a result, although lobster fishers compete with one another 
for resource units–and at times groups have experienced considerable conflict 
amongst themselves–user attributes have generally appeared to favor cooperation 
with regards to the design and implementation of conservation policies (Wilson 
et al. 2013).
Before the introduction of the first conservation laws in 1872, the Maine lob-
ster fishery was effectively an open-access system. The catch rate was sufficiently 
low so as not to threaten depletion of the resource. However, beginning in the 
1840s a lobster canning industry emerged. These canners could use lobsters of 
any size, but preferred small lobsters that could be easily processed into cans for 
sale. As this industry grew, lobster fishers noticed a decline in the availability of 
lobsters of all sizes, and the canners themselves began to lobby the state legis-
lature to protect large lobsters, as well as restrictions on taking egged lobsters, 
which had clearly demonstrated their ability to produce offspring. Their lobbying 
had its intended effect in 1872, with the passage of the first state laws prohibiting 
the harvest of egg-bearing females. 
We did not include a figure showing the focal action situations in opera-
tion before our first breakpoint, because that figure would not have been very 
5
 Acheson and Wilson (1996) characterize lobster regeneration as a stochastic process.
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 interesting. In effect, there was only a single focal action situation involving the 
appropriation and use decisions of lobster fishers. Licensing was a routine pro-
cess, hardly deserving separate treatment as a form of governance. However, as 
the canning industry grew in size and began to lobby the state legislature for 
favorable regulations, we begin to see the rise of a more interesting set of inter-
connected action situations. As we review below, several rounds of formal and 
informal institutional changes contributed to a noteworthy story of successful 
environmental governance (Acheson 1997, 2003).
5.1.1. Phase 1: 1872–1933
The initial years of this period were characterized by a general decline in the size 
and quantity of lobster catches and political competition between two groups of 
end users, canners and live lobster traders. Canning operations dominated from the 
1840s, but beginning in the 1870s they faced increasing competition from live lob-
ster traders, who were able to serve markets along the Northeastern seaboard, using 
ships with circulating seawater tanks. Their customers favored large ‘dinner-sized’ 
lobsters, whereas canners preferred smaller lobsters that could be purchased at a 
lower price (Acheson 2003). By 1880, however, it was clear to all parties that lobster 
stocks were declining and that something needed to be done to manage the fishery. 
Canners and live lobster traders naturally blamed each other for the decline, and each 
lobbied the Maine legislature to introduce legislation that favored their interest.
The canners initially succeeded, as the legislature promulgated laws prohib-
iting the taking of egg-bearing (“berried”) lobsters and small lobsters between 
October and April. The seasonal size restriction, not coincidentally, corresponded 
to the periods when canners shifted operations to focus on vegetables and other 
products. In other words, the legislation primarily impacted live lobster traders, 
while allowing the canners to operate as before. However, the canners’ success 
was short-lived, in part for reasons of geography and political representation. 
Lobster traders were concentrated in vote-rich population centers, while canners 
were located in just two, lightly populated counties. Over time, lobster traders 
leveraged their electoral advantage in the Maine legislature, successfully push-
ing for legislation that applied minimum-size rules throughout the year. That rule 
effectively put the canners out of business.
Although landings continued to fall, lobster prices remained high until the 
Great Depression. As shown in Figure 5, the number of licensed lobster fishers 
declined precipitously from 1928 to 1933. Then, the Maine Department of Marine 
Resources and the fisheries commissioner in particular began to play a more active 
role in the regulation of fishing activities, most notably under the entrepreneur-
ial leadership of Commissioner Crie. Along with lobster fishers, Crie lobbied the 
 federal government to ban lobster imports from Canada, and to advertise local 
lobster products. Although these efforts mostly failed at this time, they helped 
secure the Commissioner’s support for new and controversial state  measures. 
Most importantly, a double gauge law establishing minimum and maximum sizes 
for captured lobsters was adopted in 1933.
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This phase was also characterized by increasing consolidation of harbor or 
lobster “gangs” comprised of local fishers who set traps in near-shore areas, from 
which they attempted to exclude outsiders. Although members of these gangs 
competed with one another, their frequent interactions in a wide array of com-
munity activities allowed them to develop mutual trust to advance their common 
interests against outsiders. Ultimately, they were able to self-organize and enforce 
informal boundary rules with a variety of mechanisms, including cutting lines of 
traps set by outsiders.
5.1.2. Phase 2: 1933–1977
Starting before World War II, Maine’s lobster fishery began a long-lasting recov-
ery. Landings increased from about seven to eighteen million pounds per year by 
1977, and the number of licensed fishers increased more than three-fold. Despite 
the increased pressure, the combination of favorable climatic conditions, the dou-
ble gauge law, informal boundary rules and the addition of a V-notch law (in 1947) 
that helped protect the breeding stock, appeared to contribute to increased harvests 
(Acheson and Wilson 1996). The V-notch rule enacted in 1947 specified that fish-
ers could mark a “berried” female with a V-shaped cut on the tail (which amounts 
to a humanly-created attribute of some resource units). Lobsters bearing a V-notch 
could not be sold until the notch disappeared. This innovation allowed lobster fish-
ers to return reproductive females to maintain the lobster population, but it also 
became an indirect indicator of the trustworthiness of their peers (Ostrom 2009). In 
fact, that might have been the primary benefit, because some biologists suggested 
that V-notching could actually harm lobsters (Acheson 2003).
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Figure 5: Maine Lobster Fishery, 1872–1933.
*Note: Significant changes in outcome variables are denoted in bold.
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The ascendency of harbor gangs during this period tailed off into the 1970s, 
when they became less willing to actively monitor and enforce their informal 
boundaries against outsiders (Acheson and Gardner 2004). Nonetheless, most 
harbor gangs continued to enforce what Acheson (2003) referred to as a nucle-
ated boundary wherein defense increased with proximity to the harbor. Acheson 
(1997) argues that the most important change in this period is the adoption of a 
conservation ethic among harbor gangs and individual fishers. In that period, they 
began to enforce conservation rules,6 resulting in high levels of compliance.
5.1.3. Phase 3: 1977–1995
In 1977 the Federal government and regional fisheries management organizations 
intervened in the Maine lobster fishery, through a federal statute ostensibly aimed 
at protecting US fisheries from foreign fleets. By law, the national government 
was responsible for governing fisheries between 3 and 200 miles from shore, leav-
ing the state to govern the area between the shore and the 3 mile limit. In practice 
the federal government and state agencies coordinated their regulations, although 
in some instances their policies conflicted because of the stronger influence of 
local fishers on state regulators, compared to the influence of biologists and con-
servation advocates at the national level.
6
 Acheson (1988) notes that small violations such as taking a (very) small number of oversize 
lobsters for domestic consumption used to be a common practice.
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Figure 6: Maine Lobster Fishery, 1933–1977.
*Note: Significant changes in outcome variables are denoted in bold.
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In this period, lobster catches increased again after a long period of stable 
catches since the 1950s. The rules governing the lobster fishery remained largely 
intact, the only major change being the introduction of a law requiring escape-
vents to allow undersized lobsters to escape traps. That law was later modified to 
include requirements for biodegradable panels to ensure that lost traps would not 
continue capturing fish indefinitely (Acheson 1997).
The most surprising result from this period might be the Maine lobster fishers’ 
largely successful effort to resist federal modifications of their operational rules. 
Opinions varied on the utility of the V-notch laws, which codified an informal 
practice lobster fishers had adopted on their own initiative. Biologists and environ-
mental activists questioned their appropriateness as public policy, and raised con-
cerns that the practice of notching could result in infection (Acheson and Gardner 
2011). But lobster fishers vehemently defended the widespread practice as a 
proven means of protecting breeding stock by greatly facilitating direct monitor-
ing of the behavior of both fishers and merchants. The V-notch and maximum size 
limits were ultimately retained, although the minimum size limit was increased to 
align them with neighboring states. 
The respective roles of national and state officials and local fishery communi-
ties continued to evolve during this period, eventually resulting in the establish-
ment of a complex regime of zone-based co-management. This is an important 
innovation in resource governance (Acheson 2003), but it serves as the endpoint 
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Figure 7: Maine Lobster Fishery: 1977–1995.
*Note: Significant changes in outcome variables are denoted in bold.
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of our illustration of how this combined framework might help analysts track the 
changing foci of dynamic changes across different action situations.
5.2. Case overview
In sum, this illustrative case overview demonstrates that the CIS framework can 
help condense the rich contextual landscape of Maine’s lobster fishery into a more 
manageable set of relevant variables, while maintaining a tight analytical focus on 
the key processes through which changes occur over time (that is, on focal action 
situations). The key sites of change shifted over time, in ways that can be inter-
preted using a single analytical perspective and multiple models of institutional 
change.
The first round of changes appears to have been driven by new market oppor-
tunities, first in the canning industry and later in the live lobster trade. Competition 
between these two segments of the lobster industry was not direct, as canners pre-
ferred to harvest small lobsters and live lobster traders needed larger, dinner-sized 
lobsters for their customers, but their needs did conflict, because heavy harvesting 
of small lobsters by canners meant fewer large lobsters would be available for 
harvest. This competition spilled over into the state legislature, with the live lob-
ster traders ultimately prevailing, in part because of their stronger demographic 
position near population centers.
Continued dissention within the industry created an opportunity for 
Commissioner Crie to demonstrate public entrepreneurship, including the passage 
of the first double-gauge law in 1933. But a significant trade in small and large 
lobsters continued throughout the initial periods, with most of this catch being 
consumed by fishers and their families. It was only with the emergence of the 
“conservation ethic,” identified by Acheson (1997), along with increasing social 
ties within harbor gangs, that fishers began to develop and share new practices (most 
notably the V-notch), which helped protect the breeding stock via a mechanism that 
was easily monitored by the fishers. Beliefs regarding the efficacy of v-notching and 
other management measures (Acheson and Gardner 2011) developed through a 
range of individual and collective evaluative processes have helped to reinforce 
the conservation ethic since World War II, and times were very good for Maine 
lobster fishers.
However, biologists and conservationists continued to raise concerns about 
what they considered to be excessive levels of harvesting, and all parties were 
concerned by pressures from foreign fishers. Consequently, federal agencies 
began to regulate the industry. Out of this long process of political contention 
emerged a co-management regime that was explicitly based on a zone-based sys-
tem of territorial claims, which was well-suited to the nature of lobsters as a rela-
tively immobile resources and a highly concentrated fishing industry.
As we did not posit explicitly evaluative action situations in our case figures, 
despite the prominence we gave evaluation in our earlier comments, we would 
like to emphasize how the locus of key evaluative settings shifted over this period 
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of time. Initially the key evaluations were those of local fishers or manufacturers, 
who were exploring alternative market products for lobster. As competing pro-
ducer groups lobbied the state legislature for rules benefiting their own members, 
those legislators began to rely on policy evaluations provided by interest groups or 
studies by independent scholars. Beliefs regarding the efficacy of v-notching and 
other management measures (Acheson and Gardner 2011), which are developed 
through a range of individual and collective evaluative processes, have helped to 
reinforce the conservation ethic since World War II, and times were very good 
for Maine lobster fishers. By the time national regulatory institutions began to 
get more directly involved, evaluations provided by scientific organizations and 
individual scholars began to play important roles. It is worth noting that James 
Acheson, the scholar upon whose work our overview is based, participated in 
several hearings, and contributed in other ways through his own research, teach-
ing, and service activities. Clearly, the big picture would have been lost if we had 
tried to capture the complexity of evaluative processes in this case in its entirety.
Although governance institutions evolved incrementally over several 
years, they settled along a particular path set out by initial conservation laws. 
Prohibitions against taking berried females and minimum size restrictions con-
tinue to be central features of lobster management in Maine. Declining catches 
provided windows of opportunity for institutional change, including the double 
gauge and V-notch rules, and increases in minimum size limits appear to have 
coincided with periods of relative decline (see Acheson 1997).
There continue to be controversies and concerns about potential overharvest-
ing. Nevertheless, the history of the Maine lobster fishery demonstrates the utility 
of the CIS framework for a well-integrated analysis encompassing biological, 
economic, social, and political dynamics.
6. Discussion and further extensions
The CIS framework effectively leverages the dynamism of the IAD framework, 
while incorporating the details of the SES framework to analyze important 
 questions about institutional development and change. The detailed listing of key 
characteristics of this resource system in different time periods highlights those 
factors most important in marking the transition from one phase to the next. To 
implement this framework, institutional analysts should look for significant insti-
tutional or ecological changes and identify candidate action situations to which 
these changes might reasonably be attributed.
Other scholars are exploring modes of research that seem very much in the 
same spirit of the CIS framework. To begin with works clearly located within the 
Ostrom tradition, McCord et al. (2017) draw explicitly upon an earlier version of 
the ideas we present here to organize their investigation of Kenyan water gover-
nance. Mincey et al. (2013) use a network of adjacent action situations to examine 
conditions under which forests can contribute to sustainable urban ecosystems. 
Lubell et al. (2014) examine the complexity of water management through the 
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application of the “ecology of games” approach, which is closely related in spirit 
to the idea of a network of action situations, but with a more concentrated focus 
on the strategic logics of collective choice in inter-related games (Lubell 2013).
Some research teams have devised more explicitly dynamic frameworks for 
the study of social-ecological systems. Villamayor-Tomas et al. (2015) represent 
food and energy production processes as “value chains” that effectively consist of 
sequences of action situations of resource extraction, production, distribution and 
consumption. In an analysis of Maine lobster fisheries, Webster (2015) introduces 
an “action cycle” in which a problem generates signals which may or may not 
trigger a response on the part of the policy makers. We find that representation 
to be overly simplistic in requiring all policy responses to have either positive or 
negative effects on the sustainability of that resource, but the explicit sequence of 
challenge and response is worthy of further elucidation.
Other scholars frame their research methods as offering a means of diagnosing 
problems in social-ecological systems. In a recent work, Heikkila and Andersson 
(2018) emphasize the importance and value of clearly specifying action situations 
of interest and taking a diagnostic approach for contextually-specific institutional 
design. They make the important point that even though the possibility of sustain-
able self-governance is more viable than generally realized, it is not always the 
best solution.
Moving outside the Ostrom tradition, de Loë and Patterson (2018, 567) study 
institutions of water governance using a diagnostic approach, by which they 
mean “a structured process of context-specific inquiry into both the biophysical 
and human aspects of a problem situation. Diagnostic approaches should pro-
vide systemic but strategic ways of identifying and evaluating external factors 
in particular situations.” They advocate the explicit adoption of a “user-oriented 
perspective (i.e. thinking [as] an analyst, who could be a research, policymaker, 
or practitioner), and give specific regard to the challenge of suitably capturing 
relevant external factors.” (568) Despite being outside the Ostrom tradition, this 
approach to institutional analysis is pertinent to Bloomington School concerns, 
especially the explicit focus on the critical problem of determining the appropriate 
scale at which a given policy setting should be understood, and more specifically 
on the problem of where to draw the boundary between core elements of a social-
ecological system and exogenous effects from outside that system. As de Loë and 
Patterson acknowledge, there are no clear and fast rules for making boundary 
choices. They recommend that analysts initially should “frame” the problem as 
“tightly” as possible, and then “critically reflect” on the boundaries they are pro-
visionally considering. Thus begins a process of sequential and repeated consid-
eration of potential extensions by first “looking inward” to more fully understand 
the internal structure of that action situation and “spiraling outwards” to consider 
social and environmental factors that are closely tied to those core components. 
“This spiraling approach is important,” it is asserted, “because it allows for pro-
gressively expanding the scope of analysis while continuing to re-visit each key 
SES variable category in light of previous reasoning.” (571)
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These suggestions are remarkably similar to the mode of institutional diagnosis 
offered by the CIS framework. As Ostrom (2005) argues, the application of the 
IAD framework requires analysts to “zoom in and out of inter-connected action 
situations.” Our suggested method of applying the CIS framework asks institutional 
researchers to identify significant changes in key contextual variables, and to use 
those observed changes as a symptom pointing towards the underlying processes, 
that is, to the appropriate action situation responsible for that change. Then they 
must diagnose the operation of that action situation by tracing its structure back to 
the sources that determined the operating characteristics (Ostrom’s working compo-
nents) of that action situation. In short, we ask analysts to trace the relevant network 
of adjacent action situations in hopes of identifying critical points at which policy 
intervention might prove most efficacious, based on empirically-informed theory.
We admit this is an eclectic selection of research projects. Some research teams 
draw on specific aspects of the IAD or SES frameworks, others integrate IAD or 
SES components with perspectives from quite distinct research traditions, and 
some have no explicit connection whatsoever to any aspect of the Bloomington 
School. Overall, however, this variety suggests that we are in good company, 
since others are pursuing many of these same ideas. We are confident that other 
researchers will continue to draw upon the rich legacy of the IAD and SES analyt-
ical frameworks, whether or not they use the particular combination we offer here.
Although this paper highlights the potential benefits from proper utilization 
of a particular framework for analysis, we do not mean to downplay the criti-
cal importance of other modes of research designed to understand the outcomes 
of particular variables. One especially important (and frequently used) form of 
social scientific analysis relies on comparative case studies selected so as to allow 
researchers to develop and test hypotheses concerning which explanatory (or 
independent) variables have the strongest influence on determining the value of 
outcomes (or dependent variables) in those cases. The success or failure of efforts 
towards collective action is a dependent variable that is particularly important in 
the types of policy settings for which the IAD and SES frameworks are best suited. 
Thus, any application of our combined framework is likely to require researchers 
to draw upon the current state of knowledge generated by the cross-disciplinary 
study of the factors that facilitate successful efforts at collective action.
In Governing the Commons, the primary outcome variable of interest is 
the long-term sustainability of institutional arrangements for managing those 
resources. Before Ostrom (1990) could identify her famous “design principles,” 
she had to shift her attention away from the value of specific variables to focus 
instead on the overall configuration of each governance system as a whole.
Other researchers in related projects focus on identifying a reasonably small 
number of variables that are important determinants of the dependent variable in 
that analysis. For example, Agrawal (2001) lists some 30 variables as “key enabling 
conditions” for the successful operation of common property institutions. In the 
Social-Ecological Systems Meta-Analysis Database (SESMAD) project, resource 
management and international relations researchers worked together to organize 
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over 100 variables into attributes of the environment, actors, and governance sys-
tems (Cox 2014a). Specialized studies then identified the factors most conducive 
to successful collective action among actors engaged in different policy settings 
(e.g. Fleischman et al. 2014).
We acknowledge that this mode of focused analysis on particular processes 
and outcomes remains a critically important tool for social scientists and policy 
analysts. After all, the CIS framework, as a framework, can only take us so far. 
It can help researchers to consider a broad range of potentially relevant factors 
relating to their unique or iterative focal action situations. Researchers then need 
to draw upon theories and models of particular processes to move beyond the 
framework stage.
Collective action is of critical importance in all policy settings, but it is rarely 
(if ever) the only game in play. To fully understand any empirical policy setting, 
institutional analysts will need to become familiar with the forces driving particu-
lar processes of ecological change, resource appropriation, production, transpor-
tation and communication, market exchange, organizational behavior, legislative 
and judicial deliberation, electoral dynamics, public opinion, or the diffusion of 
knowledge or cultural traditions and other forms of social change. The primary 
contribution of this CIS framework is the focus it provides on ensuring that insti-
tutional analysts begin by identifying the full range of dynamic processes they 
will need to examine before their task is done.
In sum, the IAD framework is focused on the physical, social, and institu-
tional context within which collective action occurs and outcomes are realized. 
It presumes that no one action situation exists in isolation, and insists that poli-
cies live within a complex ecology of strategic interactions. The SES framework 
explicitly incorporates the nested, multi-level complexity of ecological systems, 
and suggests that, to be sustainable, institutional arrangements must somehow 
match that complexity in a productive manner. As scientific knowledge expands, 
so does the range of potentially policy-relevant concerns. Also, as public entre-
preneurs bring to the political agenda new issues and concerns related to the envi-
ronment and the sustainability of access to needed resources, then the demands 
on scientific knowledge expand ever further. In effect, biophysical conditions, 
scientific knowledge about those conditions, human communities, and the range 
of public policy are complexly co-evolving. Combining the IAD and SES frame-
works enables researchers to better understand that increasing complexity.
Institutional analysts seeking to use the CIS framework should start their 
analysis by identifying a focal action situation (or at most a few of them), learn 
how the relevant collective and constitutional choice arenas shaped that action 
situation, and then think deeply about the processes through which those condi-
tions might be changed. Applying the CIS framework to an empirical setting is all 
about “zooming in and out of inter-connected action situations” (Ostrom 2005) 
in search for places where policy interventions could be most effective, or to 
identify those critical junctures which can contribute the most to deepening our 
understanding of the relevant processes.
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